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Abstract 
Previous research has sought to establish the existence, or gauge the relative strength, of key 
self-evaluation motives (i.e., self-enhancement, self-verification, self-assessment, self-
improvement). Here, we attempted, across five samples, to quantify individual differences 
in self-motive strength, and explore their empirical ramifications. We devised brief self-
report indices for each self-motive, and checked their factor structure, reliability, and 
validity. We found that self-enhancement covaried mainly with self-verification, and that 
self-assessment covaried mainly with self-improvement, thus validating key hypotheses 
regarding their functional links. Moreover, self-enhancement and self-verification covaried 
with positive personality traits, as well as with preferences for receiving positive feedback 
and perceptions of its accuracy. In sum, self-reported variations in dispositional self-motive 
strength form theoretically meaningful patterns. 
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Self-consciousness, the hallmark of the human mind, is suffused with motivation. 
People do not merely cognize themselves as abstract entities; they also are swayed by self-
relevant strivings. In philosophical jargon, the self is not only a Cartesian ego, politely 
pondering, but also a Schopenhauerian Wille, constantly craving. Inspired by this insight, 
empirically-oriented psychologists have identified and investigated four cardinal self-
evaluation motives (or self-motives) relevant to the development, maintenance, and 
modification of self-views. These are self-enhancement, self-assessment, self-verification, 
and self-improvement (Sedikides & Strube, 1995, 1997).1 
Self-Motives 
Self-enhancement denotes the desire to see oneself positively (Alicke & Sedikides, 
2011a; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). It can involve either self-promotion (playing up one’s 
positive attributes) or self-protection (playing down one’s negative attributes). One 
commonly cited manifestation of self-enhancement is that, in defiance of statistical logic, 
most people rate themselves above-average on most personally important traits (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003).  
Self-verification denotes the desire to confirm a pre-existing view of self (Swann, 
1997; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003). The idea is that, by verifying that one is who one 
already thinks one is, one can bolster the predictability and controllability of the social 
world, both epistemically—by making oneself more understandable—and pragmatically—
by making one’s social interactions smoother. A seeming manifestation of self-verification 
is that people with negative self-views choose to interact with those who corroborate their 
self-views rather than with those who dispute them (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996; 
Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992). 
Self-assessment denotes the desire to know the truth about the self (Trope, 1982, 
1986). It involves an impartial search for objective facts about oneself rather than a biased 
search for preferred facts. One manifestation of self-assessment is that people choose 
difficult tasks that can yield accurate information about themselves over easy tasks that can 
only yield congenial information (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, in press; Trope, 1979, 
1980). 
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Finally, self-improvement denotes the desire to make the self better than it currently 
is (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995). It 
involves developing skills, abilities, and capacities in domains that are deemed to be 
personally important or central (Markus, 1977). One manifestation of self-improvement is 
that people often effortfully delay immediate gratification in order to achieve a long-term 
goal, for example, by forsaking fattening snacks in order to secure a svelte physique 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Heatherton & Nichols, 1994; Sedikides 
& Hepper, 2009). 
Prior Research on Feedback-Seeking 
 How then do people go about satisfying self-motives? One primary means of doing 
so is to solicit feedback likely to provide the desired information (Brown & Dutton, 1995; 
Hepper, Hart, Gregg, & Sedikides, in press; Sedikides, 1999). Hence, the operation of self-
motives can be indirectly inferred from the sort of feedback that people seek. Thus, 
feedback-seeking provides an empirical lens through which to inspect the intrapsychic 
motivations of the self. 
To date, several lines of research have sought, by examining patterns of feedback-
seeking, to infer the presence or absence, or to gauge the relative priority, of self-evaluation 
motives (Hepper & Sedikides, in press; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009; Swann et al., 2003; 
Trope & Neter, 1994). For example, when self-reflecting in a neutral setting, people ask 
themselves questions whose answers predominantly (though not invariably) suggest they 
wish to self-enhance rather than self-verify, and self-verify rather than self-assess 
(Sedikides, 1993). This might be taken as showing that self-enhancement is the cardinal 
motive. However, self-enhancement is also demonstrably curtailed by a variety of factors. 
These range from plausibility constraints (Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998) to social norms 
(Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1998), and from melancholy moods (Sedikides, 1992) 
to explanatory introspections (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007). Moreover, the preference 
for self-enhancement over self-assessment is contingent: people prefer accurate feedback 
before making a decision but positive feedback after making it (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 
1989), and prefer accurate feedback about malleable traits but positive feedback about 
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stable ones (Dauenheimer, Stahlberg, Spreeman, & Sedikides, 2002). Equally contingent is 
the preference for self-enhancement over self-verification: depressed people opt for critical 
feedback that confirms their negative self-view over flattering feedback that refutes it 
(Giesler et al., 1996), people who like themselves nonetheless disdain excessive praise 
(Kwang, & Swann, 2010), and couples report greater (and presumably, desired) intimacy to 
the extent that they share each others’ self-views, positive or negative (De la Ronde & 
Swann, 1998). 
Crucially, however, most of the above research has been of an experimental or 
quasi-experimental nature. Changes in some dependent variable—feedback-seeking or 
otherwise—have been interpreted as showing that, within a particular context, a self-motive 
is or is not operating, or is either stronger or weaker than some other self-motive. That is, 
evidence has been obtained either for the bare existence, or for the relative dominance, of 
some particular self-motives, in particular situations. However, this evidence does not bear 
on the issue of whether self-motives vary at an individual level. Do people differ in how 
much they desire to self-enhance, self-assess, self-verify, and self-improve? 
To our knowledge, only two investigations have so far examined individual 
differences in self-motive strength. Neiss, Sedikides, Shahinfar, and Kupersmidt (2006) 
compared and contrasted, in a small sample of incarcerated male adolescents, the type of 
feedback that different participants ideally sought from several sources (e.g., parents, peers, 
partners). Participants generally preferred accurate to confirming feedback, with liking for 
positive and constructive feedback falling in between. In a similar vein, Cai, He, Sedikides, 
and Gaertner (2010) compared and contrasted, in American and Chinese samples, the type 
of feedback undergraduate students wanted from various sources (e.g., parents, partners, 
teachers, peers). Here, participants in both cultures preferred positive feedback over 
accurate, improving, or confirming feedback. 
Nonetheless, in research by Neiss et al. (2006) and Cai et al. (2010), the emphasis 
was restricted to quantifying average levels of motive strength: no attempt was made to 
explore variations in motive strength from a dispositional perspective. Clearly, however, 
such variations are likely to predict consequential variations in other key variables (e.g., 
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personality traits, self-judgments, behavioral preferences), given that self-motives are 
theorized to exert a powerful psychological impact. Although attempts to quantify other 
individual differences in motivation are commonplace within social psychology (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; 
Emmons & McAdams, 1991; Robinson & Sedikides, 2009), no study has yet explored the 
nature or implications of similar differences in self-motive strength. The objective of the 
present research is to begin to remedy this deficiency. 
Overview and Hypotheses 
 We sought to create brief self-report scales to assess individual differences in self-
motives (cf. Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). To this end, we conducted five multi-
purpose studies (A, B, C, D, E). We began by testing whether our items exhibited the 
predicted factor structure (A, B, D). Next, we tested whether the scales they yielded 
possessed adequate inter-item consistency (A), test-retest reliability (B, D), content validity 
(C), and predictive validity (D). Finally, we examined how the four self-motives related to 
other key personality variable associated with positive self-views (i.e., high self-esteem, life 
satisfaction, extraversion) and negative self-views (i.e., low self-esteem, neuroticism) (A, B, 
E), and predicted the desired and perceived accuracy of vignettes featuring hypothetical 
feedback (B). In the latter two cases—and when examining the correlations between 
different self-motives (A, B)—we tested how well the data fit two general hypotheses about 
interrelated self-motive functions: the assessment-with-improvement hypothesis and the 
verification-with-enhancement hypothesis. 
Assessment-with-Improvement 
Sedikides and Skowronski (1997, 2003; see also Sedikides, Skowronski, &Dunbar, 
2006) proposed that, over the course of human evolution, self-motives functioned 
adaptively to elicit information that promoted survival and reproduction. More specifically, 
they proposed that self-assessment and self-improvement functioned as an interactive pair 
of learning motives, the former leading to the acquisition of information about how one 
currently is, the latter to the acquisition of information about how to become better in future 
(Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000, 2009). They furthermore speculated (Sedikides & 
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Skowronski, 2000, p. 104) that dispassionate self-assessment might facilitate objective self-
improvement. If this evolutionary theorizing is correct—and indeed, it is hard to imagine 
how effective self-improvement could take place in the absence of accurate appraisals of 
one’s true status—then the two motives should converge empirically. In addition, a priori 
reasoning suggests that people might also seek to self-improve in order to self-assess. For 
example, pushing the boundaries of one’s ability would be one way of obtaining feedback 
about those abilities. Admittedly, self-improvement does not seem to be a precondition for 
self-assessment in the same way that self-assessment does for self-improvement. 
Nonetheless, such reverse functionality, if present, should push for even greater empirical 
convergence between the motives. 
Relation to self-views. How might the motives to self-assess and self-improve relate 
to people’s self-views? Everyday intuition suggests that the more negatively people view 
themselves, the more they should seek to self-improve. However, this intuition may be 
mistaken. Research indicates that people with negative self-views disdain opportunities to 
endorse positive self-beliefs and to self-induce positive moods (Heimpel, Wood, Marshall, 
& Brown, 2002; Swann et al., 2003; Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003), even though they 
would especially stand to benefit from such intrapsychic remedies. Their aversion to 
positive psychological change may stem from their belief that achieving change is unlikely 
(McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981; Wood, Heimpel, Newby-Clark, & Ross, 2005) and that 
therefore attempts at change are too ambitious (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Josephs, 
Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992). In light of these findings, there are also grounds for 
predicting that, the more negatively people view themselves, the less they should seek to 
self-improve. If both processes operate, then the result may be a wash: the motives may not 
be strongly related either to personality traits associated with positive self-views (e.g., 
extraversion, high self-esteem), or with personality traits associated with negative self-
views (e.g., neuroticism, low self-esteem). 
Relation to preferences for and perceptions of self-descriptions. Finally, how 
should the motives to self-assess and self-improve relate to people’s preferences that 
differentially favorable descriptions of themselves be true or false, and to perceptions that 
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such descriptions are actually true or false? If self-assessment is about discovering the 
objective truth about oneself, then the motive should relate neither to truth-preferences nor 
to truth-perceptions: it should neither shape the former nor bias the latter. Moreover, if self-
improvement is about making oneself better in the light of how one actually is, then the 
motive may inherit from self-assessment the same lack of relation with truth-perceptions. 
Still, one might predict that the motive to self-improve would correlate with truth-
preferences—in particular, with preferring favorable descriptions of oneself to be true, and 
unfavorable ones false. 
Verification-with-Enhancement 
Self-verification theory (Swann et al., 2003) does not specify how the motives to 
self-enhance and self-verify functionally interrelate. The default assumption is that they 
should operate independently. If so, they should sometimes concur (i.e., among people with 
positive self-views) and sometimes conflict (i.e., among people with negative self-views). 
Indeed, Sedikides and Skowronski (2000) speculated that the two motives evolved to assist 
in the acquisition of very different types of adaptive information. Whereas self-
enhancement yielded information promoting affective well-being, thereby fostering 
endurance and sociability, self-verification yielded information preserving stable self-views, 
thereby fostering prudence and continuity. 
We suggest here, however, that the motives to self-enhance and self-verify often 
operate in concert. Suppose one views oneself positively, as most people do (Alicke & 
Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Alicke, in press). If so, one can 
readily self-enhance by seeking feedback that verifies one’s self-view, because that 
feedback is positive. Hence, the more one seeks to self-enhance, the more one should seek 
to self-verify—and vice versa. True, this functional interconnection may not obtain for 
people with starkly negative self-views. However, such people are in the minority. Hence, 
the motives to self-enhance and self-verify should be, normatively speaking, correlated. 
The reverse dynamic may also underlie this correlation: that is, people seek self-
enhancing feedback in order to self-verify. Specifically, if one’s self-view is already 
positive, then one could, in principle, attempt to verify that self-view by seeking positive 
Dispositional self-motives     9 
feedback, so as to “bolster […] feelings of psychological coherence” (Swann et al., 2003, p. 
369). However, given that people with positive self-views are already high in self-certainty 
(Campbell et al., 1996; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005), the need for any such defensive 
bolstering may be less acute. Hence, this latter dynamic is liable to be of lesser importance 
(but see Swann & Pelham, 2002). 
Relation to self-views. How might the motives to self-enhance and self-verify relate 
to people’s self-views? Consider the motive to self-enhance. People with positive self-views 
self-enhance to greater extent or more successfully (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010; 
Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). This should partly reflect a stronger 
motive to self-enhance, just as greater achievementpartly reflects a stronger motive to 
achieve (McClelland, 1987). On the other hand, people with negative self-views, vexed by 
self-effacement, may also be keener to self-enhance, just as people previously poor can 
sometimes be more materialistic (Kasser, 2002). On balance, we expect that self-
enhancement should covary directly with traits associated with positive self-views and 
inversely with traits associated with negative self-views—but only modestly and 
inconsistently. 
As for the motive to self-verify, self-verification theory (Swann et al., 2003) makes 
no a priori prediction about its relative strength in people with positive versus negative self-
views. The default assumption would appear to be that the strength of the motive to self-
verify does not covary with the valence of self-views: whatever one’s self-view, one should 
strive to maintain it in order to safeguard intrapersonal coherence and interpersonal 
harmony. However, if the motives to self-verify and self-enhance are functionally related in 
the majority of people, then one would expect the motive to self-verify to covary directly 
with traits associated with positive self-views, and inversely with traits associated with 
negative self-views. 
Relation to preferences for and perceptions of self-descriptions. How should the 
motives to self-enhance and self-verify relate to people’s preferences that differentially 
favorable descriptions of themselves be true or false, and perceptions that such descriptions 
are actually true or false? If self-enhancement is about wanting the truth about oneself to be 
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positive, then the motive should relate both to truth-preferences and to truth-perceptions, In 
particular, the motive should (a) increase preferences for favorable descriptions and 
decrease preferences for unfavorable ones, and (b) bias perceptions that favorable 
descriptions are true and unfavorable ones are false. Moreover, if self-verification serves the 
same function as self-enhancement does, a similar pattern should emerge. 
Method 
Participants 
All participants were University of Southampton undergraduates, except those in 
Study C, who were volunteers recruited from the internet. In studies A, D, and E, they were 
psychology students taking part for course credit; in Study B, they were mathematics 
students taking part for confections. Note that participants in studies A and D—drawn from 
the same pool in the same semester—partially overlapped (i.e., 22 participants took part in 
both studies). 
For each of the studies, sample size, percentage of females, and mean age were as 
follows: Study A (N = 251; 81%; 19.4); Study B (N = 102; 30%; 19.3); Study C (N = 40; 
70%; 30.4); Study D (N = 96; 90%; 19.8); and Study E (N = 195; 85%; 20.5). Additional 
inquiries indicated that, in Studies A and E, most participants were White (> 94%) and 
British (> 95%), whereas those in Study C (i.e., the internet sample) were mostly from the 
USA (60%) with the remainder being from Canada, United Kingdom, or Australia. 
Design and Procedure 
Study A involved a single session, administered on computer. Participants 
completed measures of self-motives and personality traits as part of a larger battery of 
measures.  
Study B involved three sessions, administered in class on successive days. During 
the first session, participants completed measures of self-motives; during the second, 
measures of self-motives and personality traits; and during the third, a criterion measure 
involving the preferred truth and perceived accuracy of four differently valenced self-
descriptions. 
Study C involved a single session, administered online. Participants read four 
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standardized descriptions, each corresponding to one self-motive (Appendix A). The 
content of the descriptions was crafted to articulate the meaning of each self-motive in 
accordance with its current and consensual scientific understanding. Each motive (neutrally 
designated by a capital letter) was characterized as involving a desire to meet some self-
relevant goal, and as prompting people (a) to prefer partners or tasks conveying some type 
of feedback, (b) to care about personally being some way, and (c) to hope that their future 
would turn out some way. Care was taken to avoid linguistic overlap or semantic 
redundancy between the descriptions and their corresponding self-motive items. Initially, 
the four descriptions were shown one-by-one, in random order, to familiarize participants 
with them. Next, each description was again shown, in a different random order, 
accompanied by the eight self-motive items. Participants were instructed to rate each item in 
terms of how well it “capture[d] the meaning” of the motive described on a 7-point scale 
ranging from Very Poorly to Very Well. 
Study D involved two sessions, administered between one and four days apart, the 
first on computer, the second in the laboratory. During the first session, participants 
completed the self-motive items, unobtrusively embedded in a large battery of unrelated 
measures. During the second session, they completed a problem-solving task in pairs. This 
involving30-minute task required participants to build a bridge using only newspaper and 
adhesive tape. They were told that they would shortly receive feedback (never actually 
provided)about their individual task performance. Participants were then presented with 
summaries of four different types of feedback that were ostensibly available, each designed 
to satisfy one of the four self-motives. On the basis of the summaries, they rated how much 
they wanted to receive each feedback type. A subset of 60 participants from Study D (98% 
female, MAGE = 19.3) completed the self-motive items again as part of a battery of measures 
in a different study between five and nine months later (MMONTHS = 7.87). 
Finally, Study E involved three sessions, administered on computer on successive 
days. During the first session, participants completed measures of self-motives and all 
personality traits except self-esteem. During sessions two and three, participants completed 
measures of self-esteem, which were subsequently averaged to enhance simplicity and 
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reliability. 
Measures 
Self-motives. Eight self-motive items were administered. Each featured a 7-point 
scale with descriptors ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Four items 
inquired into the type of feedback people liked to hear about themselves,2 another four into 
the type of facts people wanted to discover about themselves (Appendix B). Thus, two items 
were designed to measure each self-motive. For brevity, we will use the prefixes H- (for 
“hear”) and D- for (“discover”) to denote these two types of items. 
Self-esteem. Participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965), a 10-item questionnaire balanced for positive and negative items (α ≈ .90).3 Each 
item featured either a 7-point scale (Studies A and B) or a 4-point scale (Study E). Sample 
item: “I feel that I have a number of good qualities.” 
Life satisfaction. Participants in Studies A, B, and E also completed the Satisfaction 
with Life Scale (Pavot & Diener, 1993; α ≈ .85). This 5-item measure featured a 7-point 
scale, with descriptors ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Sample item: 
“The conditions of my life are excellent.” 
Extraversion and neuroticism. Participants in Study E completed two 7-item 
subscales, one assessing extraversion (α ≈ .87), the other neuroticism (α ≈ .88), drawn from 
the 44-item version of the Big Five Inventory (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). In Studies A 
and B, a briefer instrument, featuring two items per subscale (adjusted split-halves: 
extraversion r≈ .77; neuroticism r≈ .68) was administered (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003). All items featured a 7-point scale, with descriptors ranging from Strongly Disagree 
to Strongly Agree. Sample items: [I see myself as someone who] “…is enthusiastic” 
(extraversion), “…can be moody” (neuroticism). 
Impression management. Participants in Study E completed the 20-item 
impression management subscale (α =.74) of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding, Version 7 (Paulhus, 1998), an index of socially desirable responding. Items 
featured a 7-point scale ranging from Not At All Like Me to Very Much Like Me. Sample 
item: “I never cover up my mistakes.” 
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Criterion Variables 
Desire for expected feedback (Study D). In their follow-up session, participants in 
Study D were notified that they would receive feedback about their problem-solving 
abilities on the basis of their videotaped task performance. Specifically, they were notified 
that expert raters would provide feedbacklater in the form of short written summaries, and 
that they would now have the opportunity to request none, some, or all of the summaries for 
subsequent perusal. Four types of summary were identified on the basis of their titles. Each 
summary ostensibly contained information designed to satisfy one of the four self-motives. 
Participants were offered summaries whose titles promised to provide feedback: “… [about] 
the ways in which you are a particularly excellent problem-solver” (self-enhancement);”… 
[providing] an honest assessment of the type of problem-solver you really are” (self-
assessment); “… that confirms what you already believe about your problem-solving 
abilities” (self-verification); and “…[about] your problem-solving potential” (self-
improvement). Participants indicated how much they wanted to receive each feedback 
summary on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (a very great deal). 
Self-descriptions: Truth preferences and accuracy perceptions (Study B). In 
their follow-up session, participants in Study B read four descriptions “of the sort that a 
clinical psychologist might write” and imagined that each had been written about them (see 
Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003, for the full text). The descriptions ranged 
from depicting someone with a definite “negative attitude” towards themselves (very 
unfavorable), to someone who has “some difficulty” liking themselves (unfavorable), to 
someone who feels “pretty good” about themselves (favorable), to someone which thinks 
“extremely highly” of themselves (very favorable). For each description, participants rated 
on 7-point scales (a) how much they ideally wanted it to describe themselves, and (b) how 
accurately they believed that, in fact, it described themselves. 
Results and Discussion 
Structure of Self-Motive Items 
 If each item pair adequately assessed a distinct self-motive, then a four-factor model 
should fit the data best. We duly performed a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to test 
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this model. To obtain a sufficiently large sample, we combined the data from Studies A, B, 
and D.4 The total sample, after removing participants with missing data, numbered 426 
(74.6% female; MAGE = 19.50). For the CFA, each self-motive was modeled as a latent 
variable with two indicators (the H-item and D-item). All four self-motives were let 
correlate freely. This model fit the data exceedingly well, χ2(14) = 20.69, p = .11, CFI = .99, 
RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .03. All items loaded significantly onto their respective factors, βs 
> .63, ps < .001, and the estimated correlations between factors were low-to-moderate in 
size (Table 1). In addition, the four-factor model fit the data significantly better than both 
(a) a single-factor model in which all items defined a single factor, ∆χ2(6) = 185.59, p< 
.001, and (b) a two-factor model in which self-assessment and self-improvement items 
defined one factor, and self-enhancement and self-verification the other, ∆χ2(5) = 78.66, p< 
.001. This structural evidence provides discriminant validity for the four self-motive 
indices, and suggests that, despite significant interrelations, they are indeed distinct 
constructs (Kline, 2005). 
Reliability of Self-Motive Indices 
Inter-item correlations. We measured each self-motive with one H-item and one 
D-item. If item pairs were internally consistent, then correlations between conceptually 
corresponding H-items and D-items should be generally greater than those between 
conceptually non-corresponding H-items and D-items, even allowing for the possibility of 
some meaningful examples of the latter (e.g., particular correlations predicted by the 
assessment-with-improvement and verification-with-enhancement hypotheses, further 
discussed below).  
Table 2 depicts the relevant correlation matrices for Studies A and B.5 In both 
studies, the on-diagonal correlations, reflecting item pair internal consistency, exceeded the 
off-diagonal correlations. In particular, the ratio of the mean on-diagonal correlation to the 
mean off-diagonal correlation was 4.9 to 1 in Study A, and 2.8 to 1 in Study B. Moreover, 
the within-motive inter-item correlations were comparable to those reported for other 
published two-item scales, such as the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003: 
on-diagonal rMEAN = .66;off-diagonal rMEAN = .26;ratio = 2.5 to 1). 
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Thus, the H-items and D-items converged coherently. That is, in terms of item 
phrasing, what people liked to hear about themselves, they also wanted to discover about 
themselves. Together with the excellent-fitting CFA model, this gave us sufficient grounds 
for averaging across each pair of self-motive items in all subsequent analyses. For brevity, 
we label the resulting indices enhancement, assessment, verification, and improvement. 
Descriptive statistics for these indices in Studies A and B are also shown in Table 2. 
Test-retest reliability. In Study B, self-motives were measured on two occasions, 
two days apart (N = 57). Moreover, in Study D, self-motives were measured on two 
occasions, an average of seven months apart (N = 60). We computed two indices of test-
retest reliability for each sample: one raw index, reflecting the simple correlation between 
self-motive indices across occasions; and one disattenuated index, reflecting that correlation 
adjusted for the internal consistency of each index (Table 3). The internal consistency was 
computed as the inter-item correlation adjusted upwards in line with the Spearman-Brown 
Prophecy formula (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991, pp. 74-117). 
 Overall, the raw test-retest correlations across two days were similar in size to the 
corresponding inter-item correlations. Those across seven months were smaller but 
nonetheless statistically significant. However, given that test-retest correlations are 
attenuated by random error in each measured index, disattenuated correlations arguably 
provide a better estimate of the stability of the latent construct. For all self-motive indices 
except improvement, the estimated stability of the latent constructs across two days 
approached unity, and, for all self-motive indices, the estimated stability over seven months 
was moderate in size. This suggests that the self-motives, with the exception of self-
improvement, vary only modestly over a two-day period, and may even remain reasonably 
stable over a seven-month period. 
Validity of Self-Motive Items 
Having established that our self-motive items exhibited a sound factor structure, and 
that the self-motive indices exhibited adequate levels of reliability, we sought evidence of 
their validity. In particular, we investigated the content of the items, and the predictive 
validity of the indices. 
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Content validity. Study C examined how closely online raters linked each self-
motive item with a theoretical description of the motive it was designed to measure (Table 
4).If participants judged that each self-motive item fit the corresponding description well, 
but fit the three non-corresponding descriptions poorly, then that would be evidence that the 
content of the items reflected the meaning of the constructs they were designed to measure. 
To test this, we first conducted, on the eight ratings associated with each of the self-motive 
descriptions, a within-subjects ANOVA with 2 (item type: H-item vs. D-item) X4 (self-
motive assessed: enhancement vs. assessment vs. verification vs. improvement) design. For 
all four descriptions, a significant effect emerged for self-motive (range Fs[3,177]: 27.63 to 
45.29; all ps < .0005), but not for item type (range Fs[3,177]: 3.95 to 0.46; all ps > .05). 
Given the latter finding, we averaged H-item and D-item ratings for subsequent analyses.  
Next, for each self-motive description, we averaged the ratings accorded to non-
corresponding items (e.g., for the enhancement description, we averaged the ratings for 
items designed to measure assessment, verification, and improvement). We then statistically 
compared these averaged non-corresponding ratings to the ratings for corresponding items 
(e.g., for the enhancement description, the ratings for items designed to measure 
enhancement). In all four cases, a significant difference emerged (range Fs[3,177]: 41.73 to 
81.22; all ps < .0005). In addition, none of the averaged non-corresponding ratings differed 
significantly from the scale midpoint, ts(39) <0.66, all ps >.52. However, all the 
corresponding ratings significantly exceeded, not only the midpoint (value =4) on the 7-
point scale, ts(39) >14.94, all ps < .0005, but also the value of 6, ts(39) >2.09, all ps < .05. 
Taken together, these findings provide evidence of discriminant content validity. 
That is, the content of the items for each self-motive item map on to the concepts they were 
designed to measure, but not the other self-motive concepts, in so far as they are understood 
by everyday raters.  
Predictive validity. Study D examined whether the self-motives could predict, 
specifically and uniquely, levels of desire for corresponding types of feedback offered one 
to four days later in an unrelated setting. In particular, we tested whether each self-motive 
would (a) significantly predict desire for each corresponding type of feedback, (b) do so to a 
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greater extent than for non-corresponding motives, and (c) continue to do so even when the 
impact of other self-motives was statistically controlled for. 
Table 5 displays the standardized regression coefficients (βs) obtained when we 
simultaneously regressed the desire for each of four types of feedback in turn (i.e., 
enhancing, assessing, verifying, improving) on all four self-motives. Some evidence of 
predictive validity emerged, particularly when one bears in mind that the self-motive items 
were pitched very generally whereas the outcome variables pertained to a specific scenario 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). In particular, controlling for all other self-motive indices, 
verification and improvement significantly predicted desire for verifying and improving 
feedback respectively, and enhancement and assessment marginally predicted desire for 
enhancing and assessing feedback respectively. In addition, the significant βs for 
verification and improvement each exceeded the three competing βs in each corresponding 
regression, and the marginal βs for enhancement and assessment each exceeded two of the 
three competing βs in each corresponding regression.(Further discussion of significant off-
diagonal values occurs below.)  
Interrelations between Self-Motives 
 We proceeded to test whether the four self-motives related to one another as 
predicted. Taken together, the assessment-with-improvement and verification-with-
enhancement hypotheses, predict that assessment should be linked to improvement, and 
verification to enhancement, more strongly than any other pair of self-motives should be 
linked to one other. 
 Evidence supporting these predictions emerged from the correlations in Studies A, 
B, and D between latent factors in CFA (Table 1). Of the three significant inter-motive 
paths, one was between enhancement and verification, and one between assessment and 
improvement. Moreover, whereas these two paths did not significantly differ, ∆χ2(1) = 0.71, 
p = .40, the third significant association, between assessment and verification, was 
significantly smaller than both, ∆χ2(1) = 4.78, p < .03.  
 Earlier analyses also yielded results in line with both the assessment-with-
improvement and verification-with-enhancement hypotheses; these now bear mention. 
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Consider the significant off-diagonal correlations between H-items and D-items (Table 2). 
In Study A three out of five, and in Study B four out of five, occurred either between 
assessment and improvement items, or between verification and enhancement items. In 
addition, consider the pair of significant off-diagonal βs between the self-motive indices and 
desire for feedback in Study D (Table 5). One occurred between improvement and the 
desire for assessing feedback, and the other occurred between enhancement and the desire 
for verifying feedback. Thus, even in these preliminary analyses, patterns consistent with 
the assessment-with-improvement and verification-with-enhancement hypotheses emerged, 
further corroborating both. 
Correlations between Self-Motives and Personality Traits 
 We next examined the link between each self-motive and four key personality traits. 
In line with the verification-with-enhancement hypothesis, we predicted that verification 
would correlate positively with positive personality traits (i.e., self-esteem, life satisfaction, 
and extraversion) and negatively with negative personality traits (i.e., neuroticism). Across 
the three studies (A, B, and E), this prediction was generally upheld, despite some null 
findings (Table 6, Column 3 for each study). Participants were keener to confirm their 
identity when it consisted of congenial characteristics, and keener to dispute it when it 
consisted of uncongenial ones. Moreover, the correlations obtained for enhancement (Table 
6: Column 1 for each study) were directionally similar to those obtained for verification 
(i.e., all coefficients for positive traits were positive), even though they were less 
consistently significant. 
As for improvement (Table 6: Column 4 for each study), the only significant 
correlations to emerge involved self-esteem (in two studies) and neuroticism (in one). 
Interestingly, the direction of these significant correlations was in line with the 
counterintuitive proposition that, the better one already thinks of oneself, the better one 
seeks to become. Assessment (Table 6: Column 2 for each study) showed a roughly similar 
pattern. This provided a measure of modest support for the assessment-with-improvement 
hypothesis.  
Both results above speak to the perennial issue of whether mental health is better 
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fostered by entertaining positive illusions about oneself or by evaluating oneself realistically 
(Colvin &Griffo, 2007; Marshall & Brown, 2007; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). Positive 
traits (like self-esteem, life satisfaction, and extraversion) tend to be adaptive, whereas 
negative ones (like neuroticism) tend to be maladaptive (Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, 
Moffitt, Caspi, 2005; Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Neiss et al., 2005; Pavot & Diener, 
1993; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). On balance, the obtained 
pattern more strongly implicates enhancement as a marker for mental health than 
assessment: whereas the former showed positive correlations with self-esteem and life-
satisfaction that replicated more than once, the latter did not. 
Finally, in Study E, impression management showed only negligible and non-
significant correlations with all self-motives. This reassuringly suggests that scores on each 
index were not an artifact of social desirability. Moreover, correlations between self-
motives and personality traits remained virtually unchanged when impression management 
was partialed out (i.e., r values altered by less than .04, or 1% of variance).  
Reactions to Self-Descriptions 
 Truth preferences. As Table 7 illustrates, enhancement correlated positively with 
wanting favorable self-descriptions to be true (except in one case) and negatively with 
wanting unfavorable self-descriptions to be true. The success of this straightforward 
prediction affords confidence in the validity of the enhancement index. Also as predicted, a 
similar but weaker pattern emerged for verification, with significant effects obtained for two 
of the four coefficients. The combined pattern broadly supports the verification-with-
enhancement hypothesis. In addition, and again as predicted, assessment did not correlate 
with truth-preferences. However, contrary to prediction, improvement also did not correlate 
with truth-preferences. 
Accuracy perceptions. As Table 7 illustrates, enhancement correlated positively 
with seeing the favorable self-descriptions as accurate, and negatively with seeing the 
unfavorable self-descriptions as accurate. Furthermore, an equally clear pattern emerged for 
verification. The combined pattern again supports the verification-with-enhancement 
hypothesis. In contrast, neither assessment nor improvement correlated significantly with 
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accuracy perceptions.  
General Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this article was to capture individual differences in self-motive 
strength for the first time. Previous research has confined itself to either demonstrating the 
existence of particular self-motives, or to comparing their relative strength on average. 
However, by quantifying relevant individual differences, and by exploring their empirical 
ramifications, we set out to deepen our understanding, not only of each self-motive in 
isolation, but also of how each self-motive related to the others, and of how each self-
motive covaried with feedback preferences, personality traits, and self-perceptions. 
We began by devising two-item indices of each of the four cardinal self-motives. 
Checks indicated that the two-item indices showed evidence of internal consistency, test-
retest reliability, content validity, and predictive validity that, although somewhat variable, 
was usually satisfactory and sometimes strong. Importantly, confirmatory factor analysis 
established that the indices exhibited a coherent factor structure, and that no item was 
redundant with any other. The evidence that a four-factor model fit the data better than two- 
or one-factor models, coupled with the evidence that items conceptually fit their 
corresponding motive but not any non-corresponding motive, also supports the discriminant 
validity of the four indices.  
Next, drawing on prior theory and findings, we put forward two broad hypotheses: 
the verification-with-enhancement hypothesis—that people seek to confirm their identities 
when they want them to be positive, and the assessment-with-improvement hypothesis—
that people seek out objective personal information when they seek to effect positive 
personal change. Most basically, these hypotheses predict, respectively, higher correlations 
between the motives to self-verify and self-enhance, and higher correlations between the 
motives to self-assess and self-improve. Both these predictions received repeated empirical 
confirmation.  
In addition, the two hypotheses predict a broadly concurrent pattern of external 
correlations for each self-motive pair. For the enhancement / verification pair, such a pattern 
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emerged. In particular, both the enhancement and the verification index in general 
correlated positively with positive personality traits, and negatively with negative 
personality traits. Furthermore, both the enhancement and the verification indices correlated 
positively with wanting and perceiving favorable self-descriptions to be true, and negatively 
with wanting and perceiving unfavorable self-descriptions to be true. 
In respect of the assessment / improvement pair, however, the relevant external 
correlations were only sporadically significant. Hence, substantial conclusions are hard to 
draw. We can only offer here two post hoc speculations. First, poor improvement-related 
coefficients could have been a consequence of the improvement index being simultaneously 
responsive to (a) the perceived need for self-improvement, and (b), the perceived likelihood 
of achieving it. People who view themselves negatively, seeing more flaws in themselves, 
may seek to improve more, so as to flee their undesired self (Heppen & Ogilvie, 2003). At 
the same, however, they may not expect to improve as much, being more inclined towards 
pessimism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), and so may scale back their aspirations to 
avoid self-disappointment, being more inclined towards caution (Josephs et al., 1992). The 
upshot is that scores on the improvement index could shift in contrary directions as self-
views became more negative, thereby curtailing external correlations. Second, the poor 
assessment-related coefficients may have partly resulted from the dispassionate nature of 
the self-assessment motive. Participants may have been interested in obtaining self-
knowledge for its own sake (Loewenstein, 1994), or to make meaningful sense of 
themselves (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006), rather than merely as means to self-improve 
(see Gregg et al., in press, for further discussion of interrelated self-motive dynamics). 
Limitations and Implications 
The fledgling research outlined in this article illustrates the promise of construing 
self-motives, not as monolithically fixed entities struggling for preeminence, but as 
dispositionally varying entities capable of interacting functionally. The very fact that some 
self-motives covary suggests that, far from being isolated impulses, they are meaningfully 
related. Moreover, the ways in which self-motives covary hint at how they might be related. 
So too do their patterns of external correlation and prediction. Admittedly, some of latter 
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were patchy, and many of our findings were more suggestive than conclusive. Possibly, the 
modest internal consistency and predictive validity of our items itself contributed to this 
state of affairs. Nonetheless, let us here try to draw out at least one implication of the 
patterns we observed. 
Our most consistent finding was that the motives to self-verify and self-
enhancement hand in hand—both in terms of their intercorrelations, and in their patterns of 
external correlation. Arguably, it presents a challenge to self-verification theory (Swann et 
al., 2003). This theory postulates that identity matters in itself (Gregg, 2009; Gregg et al., in 
press). Indeed, identity seems to matter so much—as a means of safeguarding psychic 
coherence and interpersonal harmony—that people with negative self-views welcome 
criticism that confirms their self-views and disdain flattery that undermines them (Swann, 
Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992). Several findings 
cited in support of self-verification theory suggest that people with negative self-views court 
criticism as eagerly as people with positive self-views court flattery. For example, Swann et 
al. (1989, Study 3) found that an identical proportion of participants (85%) opted to interact 
with prospective evaluator who shared their self-views, regardless of whether those self-
views were positive or negative. Similarly, Giesler et al. (1996) found that, whereas most 
participants with high self-esteem (75%) opted for a positive personality summary, just as 
many participants with low self-esteem or depression opted for a negative personality 
summary (64% and 82% respectively). 
Can such findings, and their standard interpretation, be reconciled with the motives 
to self-verify and self-enhance being intimately intertwined? Suppose people self-verify. To 
the extent that they now also (a) self-enhance, and (b) see themselves positively rather than 
negatively, two consequences follow. First, they will often seek to confirm their identity not 
only for epistemic or pragmatic reasons, but also for egotistical ones. And second, they will 
seek to confirm their identities more eagerly to the extent that those identities are positive 
rather than negative. Note that the second consequence implies that people with positive and 
negative self-views should not self-verify to an equal extent—contrary to what the 
symmetrical findings of Giesler et al. (1996) and Swann et al. (1989) suggest (and for 
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nonsymmetrical findings, see: Bernichon, Cook, & Brown, 2003; Carnelley, Ruscher, & 
Shaw, 1999; Rudich, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2007; Sedikides & Green, 2004). We welcome 
future empirical work to resolve this paradox. Meanwhile, although our findings do not 
exclude the possibility that self-verification does more than merely subserve self-
enhancement, they do suggest that this is one of its key functions. 
The fact that self-motives are potentially multi-functional deserves comment. Such 
multi-functionality might explain, for example, why despite strong correlations between the 
motives to self-assess and self-improve, these motives did not align identically with external 
variables (although low correlations complicate interpretation). In general, the roles 
specified by the assessment-with-improvement and verification-with-enhancement 
hypotheses do not exhaust all possible roles that self-motives might play. For example, the 
motive to self-enhance might be tactically satisfied, not only by engaging in self-
verification, but also by engaging in self-assessment and self-improvement (Sedikides, 
2009; Sedikides & Luke, 2008; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). After all, if one believes that 
one is objectively positive, then one might seek objective information about oneself 
expecting it to be positive. Alternatively, if one wishes to self-evaluate positively in the 
future, then one might attempt to self-improve in the present to provide sufficient 
justification later. Why, then, would the motive to self-enhance not go together with the 
motives to self-assess and self-improve too? 
 The answer, we contend, is that only when the links between self-motives are 
particularly robust, and liable to be situationally invariant, do correlations emerge at a 
dispositional level. That is, we suspect that there is something intrinsic about the links 
between self-verification and self-enhancement, and between self-assessment and self-
improvement. In the first case, the subjective appeal of positive self-evaluation implies that, 
when one’s self-view is positive, it is always a pleasure and rarely an effort to keep 
checking that one’s self is as one desires it to be, whereas when one’s self-view is negative, 
it is always a pain and often a struggle to do so. In the second case, a necessary precondition 
for self-improvement is that objective self-assessment take place, because unless it does, 
there is no way to know which weaknesses one needs to remedy and which strengths one 
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can rely on. In contrast, the dynamic links between other self-motive combinations are 
looser. For example, although one can self-enhance by self-improving, there are other ways 
to self-enhance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2011b; Dunning, 2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003) and 
other reasons to self-improve (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Green, Sedikides, Pinter, & Van 
Tongeren, 2009; Pyszczynski et al., 2003).  
Prospects for Future Research 
The present research represents a first foray into new territory. Our brief measures of 
the four self-motives exhibited reasonable psychometric properties and yielded some 
theoretically interpretable findings. Nonetheless, more extensive and sensitive measures 
could yet be devised, and additional forms of validation could yet be explored. For example, 
implicit approaches to motive assessment are often useful tools for circumventing 
unawareness or evasiveness (Cai et al., 2011; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Gregg & 
Sedikides, 2010; McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989). Still, we would argue that 
explicit approaches can still capture many relevant components of the underlying 
constructs. In the present case, we found negligible correlations between all four self-
motives and impression management, suggesting that our findings are not compromised by 
socially desirable responding. Further forays into self-motive measurement are liable to add 
value to our exploration of the “Schopenhauerian” self—a locus of motivation as well as 
cognition. 
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Appendix A 
Self-Motive Descriptions (Study C) 
Self-Motive  Description 
   
Enhancement Motive P is people’s desire to feel Positive about themselves (or to avoid 
feeling negative). 
  
This motive makes people think and behave in particular ways.  
  
1) It makes them prefer tasks or people that imply they are performing 
particularly well. 
2) It makes them care about whether they are superior. 
3) It makes them hope that their personal future will be especially bright. 
  
Assessment Motive A is people’s desire to gain an Accurate idea of who they are (or to 
avoid developing an inaccurate one). 
  
This motive makes people think and behave in particular ways.  
  
1) It makes them prefer tasks or people that provide good information about their 
performance levels. 
2) It makes them care about how they really stand. 
3) It makes them curious about how their personal future will turn out. 
  
Verification Motive C is people’s desire to maintain a Consistent view of who they are (or 
to avoid developing an inconsistent one). 
  
This motive makes people think and behave in particular ways.  
  
1) It makes them prefer tasks or people that confirm they are performing at the 
levels they expect to. 
2) It makes them care about whether they are still the same as they always were. 
3) It makes them hope that their personal future will be similar to their present. 
  
Improvement Motive S is people’s desire to achieve Self-development goals (or to avoid 
failing to achieve them).  
  
This motive makes people think and behave in particular ways. 
  
1) It makes them prefer tasks or people that help them to raise their performance 
levels.  
2) It makes them care about what progress they are making towards achieving 
self-development goals. 
3) It makes them hope that their self-development goals will be achieved in the 
future. 
 
Note. Extra formatting in original. 
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Appendix B 
Self-Motive Items 
Self-Motive  Items 
   
“Hear” (H-items) In general, I LIKE to hear… 
  
Enhancement                  … that I am a GREAT person 
Assessment                  … the TRUTH about me as a person 
Verification                  … that I am the TYPE of person I THINK I am 
Improvement                  … that I can be a BETTER person 
  
“Discover” (D-items) In general, I WANT to discover… 
  
Enhancement                  …that I have EXCELLENT qualities 
Assessment                  …what I HONESTLY am like 
Verification                  …that I am how I ALREADY see myself 
Improvement                  …that I can IMPROVE myself 
 
Note. Capitalizations also present in items shown. 
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Footnotes 
1
 We do not suggest that these four motives constitute an exhaustive list. Additional 
motives (see Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006, for a review) include the 
need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), the need to be effective and autonomous (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000), and the need to find existential meaning (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). However, the four motives on which we focus constitute a coherent 
class in that they are all epistemologically oriented: they shape the process whereby beliefs 
about the self form or change (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, in press). 
2
 Study E featured only these four items. 
3
 Internal consistency coefficients are given approximately, given sample multiplicity. 
4Data from Study E could not be used in CFA because participants completed H-items 
only. For the 22 participants who completed both Study A and D, data were retained for the 
study which they completed first chronologically (resulting in use of Study A data from 10 
participants and Study D data from 12 participants). By the same logic, data from Session 1 
(not Session 2) of Studies B and D were used here. 
5
 Here and elsewhere, we report only a subset of the possible analyses that could be run 
on our data. These subsets are selected to address optimally questions of interest. In the 
present case, for example, we excluded data from Study D because Study A featured a higher 
N (given their partial overlap, only one could be chosen), and we excluded data from Study E 
because it featured H-items only. In addition, we used data from Session 2 rather than Session 
1 of Study B, because they were administered as part of a larger data collection, just as in 
Study A. Nonetheless, the corresponding analyses for Study B and D yielded nearly identical 
results (Study B, Session 1: on-diagonal rMEAN = .45, off-diagonal rMEAN = .07, ratioON-OFF = 
6.24:1; Study D: on-diagonal rMEAN = .53, off-diagonal rMEAN = .10, ratioON-OFF = 5.16:1). 
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Table 1 
Correlations between Self-Motive Latent Factors 
 
 
Enhancement Assessment Verification 
  
Enhancement —
 
  
Assessment .02 —  
Verification .37*** .27*** — 
Improvement .01 .58*** .11 
 
Note. N = 426, combined across non-redundant and non-missing data 
in Studies A, B, and D. Correlations are estimated from the CFA 
solution. 
***p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Studies A and B: Intercorrelations between H-items and D-items and Descriptive Statistics 
for the Four Self-Motive Indices 
 H-Enh H-Asm H-Ver H-Imp 
Mean r 
on-
diagonal  
Mean r 
off-
diagonal  
Mean (SD) 
for Index 
 
Study A       
 
D-Enh 
 .48*** -.02 .14* -.04   5.66 (1.00) 
D-Asm  -.04 .45*** .13*  .27*** 0.49 0.10  5.55 (0.94) 
D-Ver  .11 .18** .58*** .04 5.22 (1.15) 
D-Imp -.00 .34*** .05 
 .45***   5.04 (1.13) 
        
Study B        
D-Enh .46*** .07 .32** .14   5.90 (0.88) 
D-Asm .18 .72*** .30** .24* 0.59 0.21 5.67 (0.96) 
D-Ver .38*** .11 .62*** .11 5.16 (1.02) 
D-Imp .18 .34** .12 .55***   5.22 (1.02) 
  
 
     
 
Note. Inter-item reliabilities for each self-motive pair are listed in the diagonals extending 
from the top left to the bottom right, both on the upper (Study A, N = 251) and lower 
(Study B, N = 102) parts of the table. Means (standard deviations in parentheses) refer to 
the combined index (i.e., average across H-item and D-item) for each self-motive. 
*p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Studies B and D: Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability of Self-Motive Indices 
Reliability Index Enhance Assess Verify Improve 
 
Study B     
Internal Consistency .63 .77 .71 .84 
Raw Test-Retest .59 .72 .65 .50 
Disattenuated Test-Retest .94 .94 .92 .60 
 
Study D     
Internal Consistency (T1) .76 .74 .62 .67 
Raw Test-Retest .33 .56 .34 .29 
Disattenuated Test-Retest .45 .79 .60 .53 
     
 
Note. Internal consistency was computed by adjusting each item-pair correlation in line with 
the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula (2r / [1 + r]). Raw test-retest reliability reflects 
simple correlations between indices across Sessions 1 and 2 (Study B [N = 102]: 2 days; 
Study D [N = 60-96]: 5-9 months). All raw correlations are significant at p< .05. 
Disattenuated test-retest reliability reflects those correlations adjusted to compensate for 
their imperfect internal consistency. 
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Table  4 
Study C: Ratings of Conceptual Fit between Self-Motive Descriptions and Self-Motive Items 
Self-Motive 
Items 
 Self-Motive Descriptions 
 Enhance Assess Verify Improve 
Enhance H  6.48 3.83 4.33 3.85 
Enhance D  6.65 4.20 4.40 4.48 
  
 
 
 
 
Assess H  3.78 6.45 4.03 4.35 
Assess D  3.43 6.40 4.00 4.40 
  
 
 
 
 
Verify H  4.80 4.55 6.18 3.85 
Verify D  4.50 4.35 6.48 3.48 
      
Improve H  3.80 3.90 3.33 6.13 
Improve D  3.78 4.10 3.53 6.43 
     
 
Note. N = 40. Ratings of conceptual fit (“Please rate each of the items below in terms of 
how well it captures the meaning of the motive described”) were given on a 1(Very Poor) to 
7 (Very Well) scale. Numbers in boldface font represent ratings of conceptual fit for 
corresponding descriptions and items. Numbers in regular font represent ratings of 
conceptual fit for non-corresponding descriptions and items. 
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Table 5 
Study D: Regression of Desire for Each Type of Feedback at Time 2 on All Four Self-
Motive Items at Time 1 
Feedback 
Type 
 Self-Motive Predictors (βs)  Overall 
R2 
 Enhance Assess Verify Improve  
Enhancing   .19†  .00 -.03  .19† .07 
Assessing   .02  .19†  .09  .28* .17** 
Verifying   .22* -.08  .27**  .08 .17** 
Improving  -.08  .14  .11  .43*** .28*** 
     
 
 
 
Note. N = 96. Beta weights for self-motive items predicting their corresponding feedback 
type (i.e., indicators of predictive validity) are listed in the diagonal extending from the top 
left to the bottom right. 
†p < .10.*p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001. 
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Table 7 
Study B: Correlations between Self-Motives and Truth Preferences and Accuracy 
Perceptions for Self-Descriptions of Varying Valence 
 
Self-Description 
Valence 
 Self-Motives 
 Enhance Assess Verify Improve 
Truth Preferences 
Very Unfavorable  -.45*** -.10 -.18 .02 
Unfavorable  -.45*** -.11 -.23* .08 
Favorable   .31**  .19  .17 .17 
Very Favorable   .21  .16  .40*** .21 
      
Accuracy Perceptions 
Very Unfavorable  -.34** -.20 -.35** -.09 
Unfavorable  -.31** -.22 -.38** -.04 
Favorable   .48***  .11  .41*** -.08 
Very Favorable   .24*  .18  .47*** -.02 
 
Note. *p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001. N = 102. 
 
 
 
 
 
